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Abstract. Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations
research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. Spatial facility location
models have successfully predicted the outcome of competition in a variety of scenarios. In a typical
facility location game, users/customers/voters are mapped to a metric space representing their
preferences, and each player picks a point (facility) in that space. In most facility location games
considered in the literature, users are assumed to act deterministically: given the facilities chosen by
the players, users are attracted to their nearest facility. This paper introduces facility location games
with probabilistic attraction, dubbed Shapley facility location games, due to a surprising connection
to the Shapley value. The specific attraction function we adopt in this model is aligned with the
recent findings of the behavioral economics literature on choice prediction. Given this model, our
first main result is that Shapley facility location games are potential games; hence, they possess
pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the latter is true for any compact user space, any user distribution
over that space, and any number of players. Note that this is in sharp contrast to Hotelling facility
location games. In our second main result we show that under the assumption that players can
compute an approximate best response, approximate equilibrium profiles can be learned efficiently
by the players via dynamics. Our third main result is a bound on the Price of Anarchy of this class
of games, as well as showing the bound is tight. Ultimately, we show that player payoffs coincide
with their Shapley value in a coalition game, where coalition gains are the social welfare of the
users.
1 Introduction
In his seminal work [14], Hotelling considers a competition between two ice-cream vendors, who
sell ice-cream to sunbathers on the beach, and wish to maximize their payoffs. The vendors sell
the same type of product, and charge the same price. Sunbathers are distributed uniformly along
the beach and every sunbather walks to his/her nearest ice-cream vendor to buy an ice-cream. As
indicated by Hotelling, the vendors will strategically locate their ice-cream carts in the middle
of the beach, back to back, as this is the only Nash equilibrium of this game.
Following that seminal work, facility location games have been a topic of major interest
in economics, operations research and computer science. Spatial facility location models have
successfully predicted the outcome of competition in a variety of scenarios. In a typical facility
location game, users/customers/voters are mapped to a metric space representing their prefer-
ences, and each player picks a point (facility) in that space. Thereupon, each player is awarded
one monetary unit for each user attracted to her facility. Even a toy example like the one above
supports powerful real-world phenomena.
In most facility location games considered in the literature, users are assumed to act de-
terministically: given the facilities chosen by the players, users are attracted to their nearest
facility. Indeed, such rational behavior of users is justified in many situations. However, far too
little attention has been paid to models where users are not deterministic, and are not simply
attracted to their nearest facility. Irrational decision making is ubiquitous, as demonstrated by
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the celebrated work of Kahneman and Tversky [16]. In this context, analyzing probabilistic user
attraction introduces new theoretical challenges to overcome, as well as practical implications.
This paper focuses on facility location games with probabilistic attraction. Our proposed
attraction function is aligned with the “Satisficing” principle in decision making [30], and the
model of selection based on small samples [11,3]. The specific attraction function we adopt can
be found in the recent experimental economics benchmark presented in [10], and its usefulness
in choice prediction is discussed in [21].
We first formally present the above modeling process to determine the attraction probabili-
ties. Using this attraction, we define the class of facility location games considered in this paper,
termed Shapley facility location games, due to a surprising connection to the Shapley value [28].
The difference between our model and Hotelling’s is analyzed using the toy example above; in
particular, we show that when both players choose the middle of the segment, this is no longer
an equilibrium profile; indeed, facilities will be selected and located in different locations.
We then show that Shapley facility location games are potential games [19]; hence, they
possess pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the latter is true for any compact user space, any user
distribution over that space, and any number of players. Note that this is in sharp contrast to
Hotelling facility location games, where pure Nash equiibrium does not always exist (see, e.g.,
[27,26,9]).
An interesting question is whether strategic interaction among the players will converge to
an approximate Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., [7,2]). The dynamics of Hotelling facility location
games refer to intractable problems, and is rarely analyzed. We show that under the assumption
that players can compute an approximate best response, approximate equilibrium profiles can
be learned efficiently by the players via dynamics in any Shapley facility location game. This
result holds for any user space (including an infinite one). We also bound the Price of Anarchy
[17,24] of this class of games, and show the bound is tight.
Ultimately, the connection to the Shapley value is provided, as we bind (non-cooperative)
facility location games with our selection of probabilistic attraction to cooperative game theory.
We show that player payoffs coincide with their Shapley values in a coalition game, where
coalition gains are the social welfare of the users.
1.1 Related Work
For a recent survey of Hotelling games the reader is referred to [5]. In the same spirit, Voronoi
games (see, e.g., [1,6,12,1]) look at the game theoretic aspects of facility location with potentially
multiple facilities for each player in general (euclidean) spaces.
The above work does not refer to probabilistic selection among facilities, an essential aspect
needed in order to deal with realistic commerce and marketing setups. An exception that does
adopt some form of probabilistic selection is the model of [13]. We will discuss how [13] can be
seen as a special case of our model in Section 6.
Probabilistic choice among products [18] is widely explored, and choice prediction [30,11,3]
is studied extensively. In this line of work, the authors wish to predict how a subject will make
his/her choice among products. In our paper the way users react given a set of products is
adopted from that literature, and embedded in the context of facility location games.
A different line of research in the algorithmic game theory literature is the study of facility
location in the context of approximate mechanism design [20]. That literature deals with the case
where only one entity dictates the place of a facility (or several facilities), while user preferences
are their private information and are strategically reported, see e.g. [25,22]. In that context the
players are the users, while our work extends facility location games where the players are the
facilities’ owners.
2 Model
Before we present our model formally, we briefly describe a general facility location game, and
elaborate on the component we revisit.
Typically in a facility location game, users are distributed in a space U , where every point
u ∈ U models a user, be it by his1 physical location, his preferences towards a product, or his
political point of view. The space U plays one more role: every point in U is also a potential
location for a facility, which is a physical location of a store, properties of a product, or political
agenda. There are n players, where each player is to locate her facility in U . Namely, a strategy
of player i is a location xi ∈ U . A strategy profile is a vector describing where each player located
her facility, x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Un.
Each user u ∈ U has a similarity function σu : U :→ [0, 1], where σu(t) quantifies the extent
to which u ∈ U is satisfied with a facility located in t ∈ U .2 Given a strategy profile x, users
are attracted to the facilities of the players according to some attraction function, which receives
the similarity vector σu(x) = (σu(x1), . . . , σu(xn)) as input.
3 Players are strategic, namely they
locate their facilities with the aim of attracting as many users as possible.
The component we revisit in this paper is the attraction function. Following the behavioral
economics literature, users do not just select the facility they are most satisfied with (e.g. are
not simple expected utility maximizers [16]). In this work we focus on the analysis of facility
location games with a user attraction function that is popular in behavioral science as described
in the introduction, thereby incorporating the human aspect in our model. Indeed, it has been
shown that this modelling is an extremely effective ingredient in the context of choice prediction
[10,21].
Given the locations selected by the players, the process of deciding which facility to select,
if any, is modeled as follows: every user samples a satisfaction threshold from the uniform
distribution4, and then chooses a facility with satisfaction level above that threshold, if such a
facility exists. If several facilities meet his criterion, he flips an unbiased coin to remain with one
facility.
Surprisingly, as we show in Section 5, the aforementioned simple and intuitive selection
process leads to a standard solution concept in cooperative game theory. More precisely, the
probability of u to select facility xi coincides with the Shapley value of player i in a cooperative
game where the value assigned to each coalition is the maximal similarity level of u with the
facilities of that coalition. For that reason, we term it the Shapley attraction function. A formal
definition of the Shapley attraction function is as follows.
Definition 1. For a strategy profile x and a user u, let
(
σ1u(x), σ
2
u(x), . . . σ
n
u(x)
)
denote the
result of ordering the similarity vector σu(x) in ascending order, and let ρi = ρi(u,x) be an
index such that σu(xi) = σ
ρi
u (x). Under the Shapley attraction function, u is attracted to each
1 For ease of exposition, third-person singular pronouns are “she” for a player and “he” for a user.
2 Commonly in facility location models, distances are used to determine the attraction. However, for ease of
presentation of the model and the analysis, we employ proximity; clearly, both notions are equivalent.
3 In Hotelling games, for instance, each user u selects a player uniformly from {i : σu(xi) ≥ maxj σu(xj)}.
4 Our results hold for any distribution, as well as in case the distribution is different for each user.
x3
x2
x1
x3
x2
x3 None
The satisfaction threshold of u
0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0
Fig. 1. Consider a user u and a strategy profile x = (x1, x2, x3) such that the similarity vector σu(x) =
(σu(x1), σu(x2), σu(x3)) = (0.3, 0.5, 0.7). Hence,
(
σ1u(x), σ
2
u(x), σ
3
u(x)
)
= (0.3, 0.5, 0.7) as well. User u samples his
satisfaction threshold Y (as mentioned, uniformly distributed random variable). If Y ≤ 0.3, then all the facilities
satisfy him, so he chooses one uniformly. If 0.3 < Y ≤ 0.5, only x2, x3 satisfy him, and so he flips a coin to choose
one of them. If 0.5 < Y ≤ 0.7, the only satisfying facility is x3, and if Y > 0.7 he will not select any facility. It
follows that u will select x1 with probability µ1(u,x) =
σ1i
3
= 1
10
, x2 with probability µ2(u,x) =
σ1i
3
+
σ2i−σ1i
2
= 2
10
,
and x3 with probability µ3(u,x) =
σ1i
3
+
σ2i−σ1i
2
+
σ3i−σ2i
1
= 4
10
. With probability 0.3 he will select none of the
facilities.
player i with probability
µi(u,x) , Pr (u is attracted to i under x) =
ρi∑
j=1
σju(x)− σj−1u (x)
n− j + 1 , (1)
where σ0i (x) = 0.
See Figure 1 for illustration. We are now ready to formally present the model. A Shapley
facility location game is composed of the following:
1. A compact set of users U , and a density function f with mass 1 over U .
2. A similarity function σ : U × U :→ [0, 1], such that σu(t) , σ(u, t) for all t ∈ U .
3. A set of players, [n] = {1, . . . , n}. The strategy set of each player i is a location (facility) in U .
The strategy of player i is denoted by xi ∈ U , and a strategy profile by x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Un.
4. Users are attracted to player facilities according to the Shapley attraction function. That is,
the probability that u will be attracted to facility xi of player i under x is µi(u,x) given in
Equation (1).
5. The payoff of player i under the strategy profile x is the proportion of users attracted to her
chosen location, i.e.
pii(x) =
∫
U
f(u)µi(u,x)du. (2)
Throughout the paper, both σu(·) and σ(u, ·) are used interchangeably. We restrict the scope
of this work to similarity functions that are Riemann integrable, for instance continuous functions
or simple functions (a finite linear combination of indicator functions). In euclidean spaces,
natural similarity functions are monotonically non-increasing in the distance. Note, however,
that a similarity function need not be monotone.
We say that a strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Un is a pure Nash equilibrium if for any
player i ∈ [n] and any strategy x′i ∈ U it holds that pii(xi,x−i) ≥ pii(x′i,x−i), where x−i denotes
the vector x of all strategies, but with the i-th component deleted.
3 An Illustrative Example
In this section we illustrate Shapley facility location games by considering a game instance,
thereby demonstrating the elements of the model. We employ the very restricted two-player,
uniform distribution on a segment setting considered in [14]. We stress that this section serves
as a demonstration only, and our results in the upcoming section apply to the model described
above in its full generality.
We focus on a game G induced by the space of users U = [0, 1], uniform probability distri-
bution f(u) = 10≤u≤1, two players, and a symmetric similarity function
∀u, t ∈ [0, 1] : σ(u, t) = 1− |u− t|.
Note that σ(u, t) is merely one minus the absolute distance between u ∈ [0, 1] and a potentially
occupied location t ∈ [0, 1].
Let (x1, x2) be a strategy profile such that x1 ≤ x2. Observe that
µ1 (u, (x1, x2)) =
{
σ(u,x2)
2 + σ(u, x1)− σ(u, x2) u < x1+x22
σ(u,x1)
2 u ≥ x1+x22
.
See Figure 2 for visualization of the above. The payoff of player 1 is given by
pi1(x1, x2) =
∫ 1
0
µ1 (u, (x1, x2)) du =
x1+x2
2∫
0
(
σ(u, x1)− σ(u, x2)
2
)
du+
1∫
x1+x2
2
σ(u, x1)du.
The construction of player 2’s payoff is similar. Using elementary calculations, one can find the
pure Nash equilibria of G.
Proposition 1. The strategy profile
(
3
8 ,
5
8
)
is the unique pure Nash equilibrium of G, up to
renaming the players.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix. Indeed, in contrast to [14], under equilibrium
profile players choose different locations. We leave the complete analysis of this setting (i.e.
more players, higher dimensional space) for future work.
4 Analysis
We now examine the properties of Shapley facility location games. We begin with showing that
every Shapley facility location game possesses a pure Nash equilibrium. Afterwards, we show that
if mild assumptions are satisfied, learning dynamics will efficiently converge to an approximate
equilibrium. This is despite of the infinite strategy space of the players. Finally, the price of
anarchy is analyzed.
4.1 Pure Nash Equilibrium
In this subsection we show that Shapley facility location games possess pure Nash equilibrium.
A non-cooperative game is called a potential game [19] if there exists a function Φ : Un → R
such that for every strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Un and every i ∈ [n], whenever player i
switches from xi to a strategy x
′
i ∈ U , the change in her payoff function equals the change in
the potential function, i.e.
Φ(x′i,x−i)− Φ(xi,x−i) = pii(x′i,x−i)− pii(xi,x−i).
w x1 1x2x1+x22
1−|w−x2|
u
Similarity σ(u, x1) = 1− |x1 − u|
σ(u, x2) = 1− |x2 − u|
Fig. 2. User similarity with respect to the strategy profile (x1, x2). The blue line is the similarity function of x1
with every user, and the red line is that of x2. Every user w ≤ x1+x22 selects x1 with probability µ1(w, (x1, x2)) =
1−|x2−w|
2
+ (|x2 − w| − |x1 − w|) and x2 with probability µ2(w, (x1, x2)) = 1−|x2−w|2 . Similarly, every user v ≥
x1+x2
2
selects x1 with probability µ1(v, (x1, x2)) =
1−|x1−v|
2
and x2 with probability µ2(v, (x1, x2)) =
1−|x1−v|
2
+
(|x1 − v| − |x2 − v|).
Theorem 1. Shapley facility location games are potential games.
Proof. Fix a player i. Given a strategy profile x, define:
cu(y;x) = |{i ∈ [n] : y ≤ σu(xi)}|.
The latter represents the number of players that attract the infinitesimal user u under the
locations of the players defined by the profile x, in case he sampled the satisfaction level y.
Consequently, the payoff of player i, formerly defined in Equation (2), can be reformulated as
pii(x) =
∫
U
f(u)
∫ σu(xi)
0
1
cu(y;x)
dydu. (3)
Next, we show that
Φ(x) =
∫
U
f(u)
∫ 1
y=0
cu(y;x)∑
i=1
1
i
dydu
is a potential function of the game. We temporarily focus on a user u. For any strategy profile
x and user u, it holds that
cu(y;x) =
{
cu(y;x−i) y > σu(xi)
cu(y;x−i) + 1 y ≤ σu(xi)
.
Therefore, we have∫ σu(xi)
0
dy
cu(y;x)
+
∫ 1
0
cu(y;x−i)∑
j=1
1
j
dy
=
∫ σu(xi)
0
dy
cu(y;x−i) + 1
+
∫ σu(xi)
0
cu(y;x−i)∑
j=1
1
j
dy +
∫ 1
σu(xi)
cu(y;x−i)∑
j=1
1
j
dy
=
∫ σu(xi)
0
cu(y;x−i)+1∑
j=1
1
j
dy +
∫ 1
σu(xi)
cu(y;x−i)∑
j=1
1
j
dy
=
∫ 1
0
cu(y;x)∑
j=1
1
j
dy. (4)
We are now ready for the final argument. Fix two profiles, (xi,x−i), (x′i,x−i). It follows that
pii(xi,x−i)− pii(x′i,x−i) =∫
U
f(u)
σu(xi)∫
0
1
cu(y;xi,x−i)
dydu−
∫
U
f(u)
σu(x′i)∫
0
1
cu(y;x′i,x−i)
dydu =
∫
U
f(u)
σu(xi)∫
0
1
cu(y;xi,x−i) + 1
dydu−
∫
U
f(u)
σu(x′i)∫
0
1
cu(y;x′i,x−i) + 1
dydu. (5)
By adding and removing
∫
U f(u)
∫ 1
0
∑cu(y;x−i)
j=1
1
j dydu to Equation (5), similar to what we showed
in Equation (4), we obtain
(5) =
∫
U
f(u)
∫ 1
0
cu(y;x)∑
j=1
1
j
dydu−
∫
U
f(u)
∫ 1
0
cu(y;x′i,x−i)∑
j=1
1
j
dydu
= Φ(x)− Φ(x′i,x−i).
uunionsq
Since U is a compact set and the payoff functions are continuous with respect to the strategy
space, a direct result from Theorem 1 and [19, Lemma 4.3] is the following.
Corollary 1. Every Shapley facility location game possesses a pure Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Convergence to Approximate Equilibrium
In this subsection we examine learning dynamics of Shapley facility location games. The solution
concept we are after is (multiplicative) approximate pure Nash equilibrium. In [7], the authors
examined convergence of dynamics in symmetric (finite) congestion games. However, in Shapley
facility location games the user space may be infinite; hence modifications are needed.
We begin with a few definitions. We say that a strategy profile x is an -pure Nash equilibrium
(-PNE) for  > 0 if
∀i ∈ [n],∀x′i ∈ U : pii(x′i,x−i) ≤ (1 + )pii(x).
Notice that if x is an -PNE, then any player cannot improve her payoff by a factor of more
than (1 + ) of what she gets under x by unilaterally deviating to another location.
In the upcoming analysis, we assume players can efficiently compute -best response, if such
exists. Indeed, this assumption holds for several plausible scenarios, such as concave payoff
functions or discretization of Lipschitz user distribution.
The dynamics we consider are the following:
Best-response dynamics:
– Until reaching -PNE:
• Pick an arbitrary player with a (1+) profitable deviation, and move her to her deviating
strategy.
It turns out that any such strategic interaction among the players will converge to an -PNE
after efficient number of iterations.
Theorem 2. Let  ∈ (0, 1). In a Shapley facility location game with n players and an initial
strategy x0, after O
(
n logn
 log
Φmax
Φ(x0)
)
any best-response dynamics converges to -PNE.
Before we turn to prove Theorem 2, we prove two supporting lemmas.
Lemma 1. For every profile x it holds that
n∑
i=1
pii(x) ≥ Φ(x)
ln(n) + 1
.
Proof. Fix a strategy profile x. Observe that
n∑
i=1
pii(x) =
n∑
i=1
∫
U
f(u)
∫ σu(xi)
0
1
cu(y;x)
dydu
=
∫
U
f(u)
n∑
i=1
∫ σu(xi)
0
1
cu(y;x)
dydu
=
∫
U
f(u)
∫
cu(y;x)6=0
1dydu.
Since Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i < ln(n) + 1, we have:∫
U
f(u)
∫
cu(y;x)6=0
1dydu ≥ 1
ln(n) + 1
∫
U
f(u)
∫
cu(y;x)6=0
n∑
i=1
1
i
dydu
≥ 1
ln(n) + 1
∫
U
f(u)
∫ 1
0
cu(y;x)∑
i=1
1
i
dydu
=
Φ(x)
ln(n) + 1
.
uunionsq
Lemma 2. Denote by i the index of the player chosen by the dynamics, and let x′i denote her
deviation. It follows that:
∀j ∈ [n] : pii(x′i,x−i)− pii(x) ≥

4
pij(x).
Proof. In case pii(x) ≥ pij(x)4 , player i has an -profitable deviation; hence it holds that
pii(x
′
i,x−i)− pii(x) ≥ pii(x) ≥

4
pij(x).
Otherwise, pii(x) <
pij(x)
4 . Next, for every u, y such that y ≤ σu(sj) it holds that
cu(y; sj ,x−i) = 2cu(y; sj) + cu(y;x−i,j) ≤ 2cu(y; sj) + cu(y;x−i,j) + cu(y;xi)
= cu(y;x) + 1 ≤ 2cu(y;x).
Thus,
pii(sj ,x−i) =
∫
U
f(u)
∫ σu(sj)
0
1
cu(y; sj ,x−i)
dydu ≥
∫
U
f(u)
∫ σu(sj)
0
1
2cu(y;x)
dydu
=
pij(x)
2
.
Hence,
pii(x
′
i,x−i)− pii(x) ≥ pii(sj ,x−i)− pii(x) ≥
pij(x)
2
− pij(x)
4
≥ 
4
pij(x).
uunionsq
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof (of Theorem 2). In one iteration of the dynamics it holds that
Φ(x′i,x−i)− Φ(x) = pii(x′i,x−i)− pii(x)
≥ 
4
max
j
pij(x)
≥ 
4n
n∑
j=1
pij(x)
≥ 
4n (ln(n) + 1)
Φ(x).
Let c = 4n(ln(n)+1) < 1. Denote by m the number of iterations until convergence. Observe that
Φmax ≥ Φ(xm) ≥ (1 + c)mΦ(x0). (6)
If m does not satisfy Equation (6),
Φmax < (1 + c)
mΦ(x0) ≤ em·cΦ(x0)⇒ m ≥ 4n (ln(n) + 1)

ln
(
Φmax
Φ(x0)
)
.
Therefore, an -PNE is obtained after at most O
(
n logn
 log
Φmax
Φ(x0)
)
iterations of any best response
dynamics. uunionsq
4.3 Price of Anarchy
In this subsection we analyze the Price of Anarchy [17,24] of the discussed games, herein denoted
PoA. The PoA measures the inefficiency of a game in terms of social welfare, as a result of selfish
behavior of the players. Specifically, it is the ratio between an optimal dictatorial scenario and
the social welfare of the worst equilibrium. If S is the set of all feasible profiles, and E ⊆ S is
the set of pure equilibrium profiles, then:
PoA =
maxx∈S V (x)
minx∈E V (x)
.
The objective function of interest is the following:
V (x) =
∫
U
f(u) max
i
σu(xi)du.
Note that V represents the sum of payoffs of the players, as well as the weighted maximum
similarity users attain from the facilities under x.
Theorem 3. The PoA of Shapley facility location games is at most 2n−1n .
The proof is in the appendix. After bounding the PoA, our objective is to show that this bound
is tight, by presenting a game instance that achieves this bound.
Lemma 3. There exists a game instance with PoA = 2n−1n .
Proof. Consider an n-player game over U = [0, 2]n. Let ei denote the i’th vector of the canonical
basis of Rn, 0 be the zero vector in Rn, and let Bi = {w ∈ U : d(w, ei) < } where d(·) is
the euclidean distance and  > 0 is a small constant. Denote by α the volume of each such Bi.
Consider the following density function:
f(u) =
{
1
αn ∃i : u ∈ Bi
0 Otherwise
.
In addition, let the similarity function be
∀u,w ∈ U : σu(w) =

1 d(u,w) <  and w 6= 0
n
2n−1 w = 0
0 Otherwise
.
We now show that the strategy profile x = (0,0, . . . ,0) is in equilibrium. Consider player i’s
payoff under x, and a possible unilateral deviation of her to ei:
pii(x) =
n
2n− 1
1
n
=
1
2n− 1 , pii(ei,x−i) =
1
n
(
n
2n− 1
1
n
+ 1− n
2n− 1
)
=
1
2n− 1 .
Since strategies outside {0, e1, . . . , en} are strictly dominated, we obtain pii(x) ≥ pii(w,x−i) for
all w ∈ U . Observe that V (x) = n2n−1 . The optimal social welfare is one, obtained when players
select unique locations, e.g. player i selects ei. Therefore, PoA =
2n−1
n . uunionsq
5 Relation to Shapley Value
Imagine a user being puzzled by the offers of the players. A novel way to decide which facility
to select is to consider the players as being collaborative, and divide its share among all players,
where each player gets a “fair” part. In this section, we show that the previously defined user
reaction function coincides with a core solution concept in cooperative game theory, and can be
characterized by a collection of desirable properties.
A cooperative game consists of two elements: a set of players and a characteristic function,
which assigns a value to every coalition, i.e. every subset of players. The analysis of cooperative
games focuses on predicting which coalitions will be formed, and how the payoff of a coalition
should be distributed among its members. One core solution concept is the Shapley value [28].
Definition 2 (Shapley value). Given a cooperative game with a set of players [n] and a
characteristic function v : 2[n] → R such that v(φ) = 0, the Shapley value is a way to distribute
the total gain among the players. According to the Shapley value, the amount that player i gets
in a coalition game (v, [n]) is:
φi(v) ,
1
n!
∑
R∈Π([n])
[
v(PRi ∪ {i})− v(PRi )
]
(7)
where Π([n]) is the set of all permutations of [n] and PRi is the set of players which precede i in
the permutation R.
The Shapley value is characterized by a collection of desirable properties:
– Efficiency:
∑n
i=1 φi(v) = v ([n]), i.e. the total gain is distributed.
– Null player: If ∀C ⊆ [n] it holds that v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C), then φi(v) = 0.
– Symmetry: If i, j are equivalent, namely v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C ∪ {j}) for all C ⊆ [n], then
φi(v) = φj(v).
– Linearity: If v, w are two cooperative games and α is a real number, then φi(αv + w) =
αφi(v) + φi(w).
For our purposes, we temporarily focus on a specific user u. The characteristic function
vu(C;x) is defined to be the maximum similarity of u to one of the facilities chosen by the
members of u under x. Formally:
vu(C;x) = max
i∈C
σu(xi).
This modeling follows the logic of Hotelling games, where each user is attracted to his nearest
facility. Therefore, each user u initiates a cooperative game that consists of the players [n], and
vu(;x) as a characteristic function.
Denote the cooperative game defined over all users by V ,
V (C;x) =
∫
U
f(u)vu(C;x)du.
We now bind the payoff of a player in the facility location model presented above and its Shapley
value of the cooperative game V .
Theorem 4. The payoff of player i under any pure strategy profile x is her Shapley value in
the cooperative game ([n], V (;x)). Namely,
pii(x) = φi (V (;x)) .
Proof. Due to [28,8], the Shapley value is fully characterized by the properties above. Therefore,
if we show that the Shapley attraction function satisfies these properties, the theorem will be
proven. Fix a strategy profile x and a user u. We show that µi(u,x) is the Shapley value of the
cooperative game vu(;x):
– Efficiency: Observe that
n∑
i=1
µi(u,x) =
n∑
i=1
ρi∑
j=1
σju(x)− σj−1u (x)
n− j + 1 = σ
n
u(x) = max
i∈[n]
σu(xi) = v ([n];x) .
– Null player: If i is a null player, it follows that vu(C;x) = vu(C ∪ {i};x) for every coalition
C, and in particular, for C = ∅. Therefore v({i};x) = v(∅;x) , 0, hence σu(xi) = 0. By
definition of µ, it holds that µi(u,x) = 0.
– Symmetry: v({i};x) = v({j};x) implies σu(xi) = σu(xj), thus µi(u,x) = µj(u,x).
– Linearity: Note that µ is defined for a single user only. Therefore, we hereby extend it: for
a distribution f over {u1, u2}, define
µi (({u1, u2}, f),x) = f(u1)µi(u1,x) + f(u2)µi(u2,x).
Hence, linearity holds as well.
Since µ satisfies Shapley’s axioms, µi (u,x) = φi (vu(;x)), and µi ((U , f),x) is the Shapley value
of player i in the cooperative game V (;x). Moreover,
µi ((U , f),x) =
∫
U
f(u)µi(u,x)du = pii(x).
Thus the theorem is proved.
uunionsq
6 Discussion
We introduced Shapley facility location games, a framework incorporating probabilistic user
behavior in facility location games. In this framework we considered choice selection among
facilities motivated by the behavioral economics literature. Our results show that such prob-
abilistic choice is “fair”, and coincides with the Shapley value of a corresponding cooperative
game. We proved that Shapley facility location games always possess pure Nash equilibria. We
also crystallized the convergence rate in these games, and bounded their price of anarchy.
The reader may wonder whether the model can accommodate an asymmetric attraction
function; that is, the case where the extent to which a user is attracted to a player depends not
only on her chosen location, but also on her identity. Such asymmetry may result from power
or influence a player possesses, which is a very natural assumption. Moreover, asymmetry can
take the form of different sets of locations available to each player.
Consider a space U and a sequence of sets L1,L2, . . . ,Ln, such that each player i is limited
to select a location in Li. For each player i, we define Si : U × Li → [0, 1] to be the similarity
function with respect to player i, where again we require Si to be continuous or simple.
All the results obtained are carried on to the asymmetric extension with minor modifications.
This is apart from the rate of the convergence to approximate Nash equilibria via best response
dynamics, as games are no longer symmetric. In particular, a pure Nash equilibrium is still
guaranteed to exist, the PoA bound is still valid, and player payoffs correspond to Shapley
values in the cooperative game.
An instance of such an asymmetric game, the limited attraction model, was recently discussed
in [13,29]. In that model, the attraction of each player i is limited to a ball of size ri, and users
outside her chosen ball will not be attracted to her. Thereupon, each user chooses, with equal
probability, a player that attracts him. It can be verified that if Li = U and if the similarity
function of player i is
∀u ∈ U , l ∈ Li : Si(t, l) =
{
1 d(u, l) ≤ ri
0 Otherwise
,
the model obtained is exactly the model of [13]. In particular, it can be verified that player
payoffs in [13] correspond to their Shapley value in the cooperative game introduced in the
previous section.
Another interesting question is whether every Shapley facility location game possesses a
unique pure Nash equilibrium, as it was the case in our illustrative example. Clearly, this is not
the case. Taken to the extreme, consider a similarity function which is constant for every user
and every location. It follows that every strategy profile is in equilibrium.
It is worth noticing that our work is distinguished from most previous work in facility location
games, as our games are not zero-sum. Interestingly, we showed they are potential games [23,19],
which allows us to connect to a main branch of research in the interplay between CS and game
theory [20].
As for future work, we believe that putting data science tasks in the context of competition
may be of interest. Since our model is general, tractable and efficient, it may serve as a benchmark
for the study of strategic product selection in data science settings. Such settings include several
Internet applications, e.g. where facilities and users are associated with document contents and
queries, respectively, and the aim of the players (content authors) is to be the closest in their
published content to as many queries as possible [4,15].
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
According to Theorem 1, every Shapley facility location game is a potential game. We shall use
the potential function in order to describe the properties of the set of pure Nash equilibria of G.
Since G is symmetric, the potential function is permutation invariant, i.e. Φ(x1, x2) = Φ(x2, x1).
Hence, w.l.o.g. we analyze the set of profiles C = {x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1] : x1 ≤ x2}. Observe that C is
a convex set.
Notice that Φ(x) =
∫ 1
0
(
max{σu(x)}+ 12 min{σu(x)}
)
du; hence Φ(x) can be computed di-
rectly using the area under the graph of the functions in Figure 2. It can be verified that this
area is
Φ(x1, x2) = x2 +
x1
2
− 7
8
(x21 + x
2
2) +
x1x2
4
+
3
4
.
Note that Φ(x) is strictly concave, hence attains one global maximum over C, which corresponds
to a unique pure Nash equilibrium of G. By differentiating Φ we find that maximum is obtained
for (x1, x2) =
(
3
8 ,
5
8
)
. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
For simplicity of notation, we use x to represent not only a strategy profile but also as the
union of the corresponding sets of facilities, i.e. x =
⋃t
i=1{xn}. Next, we define the following set
function:
vu(x) =
n∑
i=1
µi(u,x) = max
i∈[n]
σu(xi).
In addition, we shall treat the social welfare as a set function as well:
V (x) =
∫
U
f(u)vu(x)du.
The proof of the Theorem relies on the following lemma:
Lemma 4. For all x = (xi,x−i) it holds that:
pii(x) ≥ V (xi)
n
+
n− 1
n
(V (x)− V (x−i)) . (8)
Proof. We distinguish between two complementary cases: if vu(xi) > vu(x−i), then
µi(u,x) ≥ 1
n
vu(x−i) + vu(xi)− vu(x−i)
= vu(xi)− n− 1
n
vu(x−i)
=
1
n
vu(xi) +
n− 1
n
(vu(x)− vu(x−i)) ,
where the last step follows from vu(xi) = vu(x) if vu(xi) > vu(x−i). Alternatively, if vu(xi) ≤
vu(x−i), then vu(x−i) = vu(x) and
µi(u,x) ≥ 1
n
vu(xi) =
1
n
vu(xi) +
n− 1
n
(vu(x)− vu(x−i)) .
Therefore:
pii(x) =
∫
U
f(u)µi(u,x)du
≥
∫
U
f(u)
(
1
n
vu(xi) +
n− 1
n
(vu(x)− vu(x−i))
)
=
V (xi)
n
+
n− 1
n
(V (x)− V (x−i)) .
uunionsq
One more necessary notion is submodularity.
Definition 3 (Submodular function). We say that f : 2Ω → R is submodular if for every
A ⊆ B ⊆ Ω and every ω ∈ Ω \B it holds that -
f(A ∪ {ω})− f(A) ≥ f(B ∪ {ω})− f(B).
Lemma 5. For every u ∈ U , vu is submodular.
Proof. Fix arbitrary u ∈ U . We need to show that
vu (x−i ∪ {ω})− vu (x−i) ≥ vu (x ∪ {ω})− vu (x) . (9)
Observe that vu(x) is monotonically non-decreasing, thus vu(x) ≥ vu(x−i). If vu ({ω}) ≤
vu(x−i), then both sides of Equation (9) are zero. Else, if vu(x−i) < vu ({ω}) ≤ vu (x), the
right-hand side of Equation (9) is zero, while the left-hand side is positive. Ultimately, if
vu ({ω}) > vu (x),
vu (x−i ∪ {ω})− vu (x−i) = vu (x ∪ {ω})− vu (x−i) ≥ vu (x ∪ {ω})− vu (x) .
uunionsq
Corollary 2. The social welfare function V is submodular.
From here on, we follow the technique presented in [31] of valid utility systems, later crys-
tallized in [24]. Denote the optimal solution x∗ and equilibrium profile x. Due to Lemma 4 we
have:
pii(x
∗
i ,x−i) ≥
V (x∗i )
n
+
n− 1
n
(V (x∗i ,x−i)− V (x−i)) . (10)
By summing Equation (10) over all players:
n∑
i=1
pii(x
∗
i ,x−i) ≥
n∑
i=1
V (x∗i )
n
+
n− 1
n
n∑
i=1
(V (x∗i ,x−i)− V (x−i)) . (11)
Due to submodularity of V , for every i it holds that
V (x∗i ,x−i)− V (x−i) ≥ V (x∗1, . . . , x∗i−1, x∗i ,x)− V (x∗1, . . . , x∗i−1,x).
Thus
n∑
i=1
(V (x∗i ,x−i)− V (x−i)) ≥
n∑
i=1
(
V (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i ,x)− V (x∗1, . . . , x∗i−1,x)
)
= V (x∗,x)− V (x)
≥ V (x∗)− V (x). (12)
Since x is in equilibrium, it follows that pii(x) ≥ pii(x∗i ,x−i). Combining Equations (11) and
(12), we have
V (x) =
k∑
i=1
pii(x) ≥
k∑
i=1
pii(x
∗
i ,x−i)
≥
n∑
i=1
V (x∗i )
n
+
n− 1
n
(V (x∗)− V (x))
≥ V (x
∗)
n
+
n− 1
n
(V (x∗)− V (x))
= V (x∗)− n− 1
n
V (x).
Ultimately:
PoA , V (x
∗)
V (x)
≤ 2n− 1
n
.
